The American Adversary System by Pizzi, William T.
Volume 100
Issue 4 Comparative Law Symposium: Is there a
European Advantage in Criminal Procedure?
Article 9
June 1998
The American Adversary System
William T. Pizzi
University of Colorado School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal
Procedure Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for
inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact
ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.
Recommended Citation
William T. Pizzi, The American Adversary System, 100 W. Va. L. Rev. (1998).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol100/iss4/9
THE AMERICAN "ADVERSARY SYSTEM"?*
William T. Pizzi**
I am a bit conflicted in speaking to you today. On the one hand, I know that
Carl Selinger, the chair of the Comparative Law Section, would like me to extol the
benefits of comparative criminal procedure. But I can only do so in a qualified way.
I do use comparative materials in my courses and find these materials to be
tremendous teaching tools. They open students up to a range of possibilities they
would not have been willing to consider if they did not know that there was actually
a country, or sometimes several countries, where such procedures were followed.
This breaks down preconceptions and makes class discussion far more productive.
But I cannot wholeheartedly endorse the study of comparative criminal
procedure. While there are definite benefits to such study, not the least being
occasional stays in beautiful places around the world, there is a significant
downside risk to comparative study of which I am afraid I am a prime example: you
can become disoriented so that you start to lose your way within your own legal
system. I want to talk today about one aspect of my own personal disorientation in
the hopes that perhaps you can help me find my way again.
Here is my problem: though I teach in an American law school and have at
this point taught many students who have gone on to become excellent prosecutors
and public defenders - even quite a few judges as the years have gone by - I no
longer seem to understand the distinction that is being drawn when American
lawyers and judges proclaim insistently and proudly that "we have an adversary
system." I have until this point in time covered up my ignorance pretty well. When
some respected judge or trial attorney gives a lecture at my law school and
announces with fervor that "ours is an adversary system," confident that he or she
has expressed some obvious and basic truth about our American legal system, I nod
in agreement like the rest of the audience. But deep down I do not understand the
distinction being drawn and what is supposed to separate the American trial system,
and presumably the English system, from other western trial systems. The world
that seems black and white to others seems to be only gradations of gray to me:
some dark, some light, but all shades of gray.
The thesis of this essay - that there is no line that can be easily drawn between adversary and
inquisitorial trial systems - is a greatly condensed version of chapter five of TRIALS WITHOUT TRUTH
(New York University Press) which will be published later in 1998.
Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law.
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It is usually thought that the distinguishing feature of an adversary system
is the fact that the evidence for the state and the evidence for the defense is
presented by the lawyers, not the judge, with the judge playing a more passive role
in the development of evidence at trial. But the problem I have with this test is that
while there are traditional continental systems where judges decide who the
witnesses will be and do most of the questioning of witnesses, sometimes in these
same systems the judges cede the power to call witnesses and do the initial
questioning to the parties. What does that say about whether the system on the
whole is an adversary system or not? Can a system be an adversary system on some
days of the week but not others?
And why is the calling of witnesses by the parties, not the judge, the true
distinguishing characteristic of what denotes an adversary system in any event? At
a couple of rape trials I saw in Germany, even though the judges controlled the
production of evidence for the most part and did most of the questioning, issues at
the trial were sometimes very sharply contested. At one of the trials, the rape victim
was brought back to the court to testify on three separate occasions as the defense
continued to bring forward witnesses who insisted that the victim routinely
prostituted herself to support her drug habit. The two defense lawyers put very
tough questions to the victim, impugning both her character and her credibility. The
trial seemed very adversarial, even bitterly adversarial to me.' Yet, this was
presumably not an adversary system - why is that?
What is further confusing to me about the adversary-inquisitorial distinction
are those non-common law countries that have the audacity to insist that they have
adversary systems. Despite being self-professed adversarial systems, those systems
seem to have trial features that make trials seem unlike any I have seen in the
United States, or England for that matter. Italy purports to have an adversary
system - the two sides are assigned the obligation of presenting the evidence - yet
crime victims or their families have broad rights of participation at trial and the
judges often exercise the power - which exists in the United States in theory but is
never used - of calling additional witnesses on their own.2
Norway is another puzzler to me. It looks like an adversary system in many
While the treatment of crime victims at trial in Germany is in some respects similar to the
way crime victims are treated in the American criminal justice system, crime victims in Germany have
many procedural advantages denied to victims in the American criminal justice system, such as a much
broader right to participation in the trial when the crime is a serious one, such as a serious assault or
rape. See generally William T. Pizzi & Walter Perron, Crime Victims in German Courtrooms: A
Comparative Perspective on American Problems, 32 STAN. J. INT'L. L. 37 (1996).
2 See William T. Pizzi & Luca Marafioti, The New Italian Code of Criminal Procedure: The
Difficulties ofBuilding an Adversarial Trial System on a Civil Law Foundation, 17 YALE J. INT'L L.
1(1992).
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respects: the lawyers for the state or for the defense have the responsibility of
presenting the evidence. There is even an occasional jury trial, which ought to
please us Americans since our trial system is tied heavily to juries. Yet Norway's
trials seem to have features that American lawyers and judges have told me would
be inconsistent with an adversary system: relaxed rules of evidence, a strong
preference for narrative testimony, mixed panels of judges and citizens for the vast
majority of cases, considerable authority vested in the judges to intervene or even
take over the questioning of witnesses, and broad appellate review of both
convictions and acquittals. In addition, the defendant, as is generally true on the
continent, is always asked to respond to the charges at the start of the trial before
any witnesses are called. In the end, does Norway qualify as an adversary system?
I do not know.
Lately, it has occurred to me that maybe I am taking the wrong approach in
concentrating so heavily on what happens at trial in my attempt to distinguish true
adversary systems from the impostors. I have started to wonder if the distinction
is not the trial itself, but rather the way the police are conceptualized in different
legal systems. Here I do find a meaningful distinction between the United States
and England on the one hand and continental countries on the other hand. In
England and the United States, the police are unhesitatingly viewed as aligned on
the side of the prosecution from the moment the crime is committed until the
prosecution ends. Trials are about "the state" - by which we mean the prosecutor
and all police agencies - aligned against the lone defendant. To that end, the police
share openly the results of their investigation with the prosecution but lots of
information from the police investigation is never disclosed to the defense because,
of course, the defense is "on the other side." We need a specialized set of rules -
discovery rules -to tell the police and prosecutor what information has to be turned
over to the defense and when such disclosure should take place.
By contrast, the police in continental countries tend to be seen as
investigators for both the prosecution and the defense and thus everyone at trial -
the state's attorney, the defense attorney, and the judge -tends to work out of the
same file and to have roughly the same body of information with which to prepare
for trial.
But if this adversary alignment of the police and the prosecutor is what
marks out systems that are truly adversary systems from those that are inquisitorial,
I cannot understand why we would be so proud of an alignment of forces against the
suspect that seems so unbalanced in terms of resources and so likely to produce
police investigations that are biased, slanted, or even distorted to favor conviction.
I have to wonder if it is not a direct result of the way investigations are
conceptualized as adversary undertakings that has resulted in the Guildford Four,
the Birmingham Six, and other highly publicized miscarriages of justice in England
or the serious distortions and worse that have been uncovered in the Federal Bureau
1998l
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of Investigation's laboratory in the United States. Instead of conceptualizing the
police and prosecutor as one entity as we do, it would seem to me that strong trial
systems would try to encourage the police and prosecutor to see their
responsibilities as different and distinct. Continental systems seem to do that better
than so-called adversary systems.
When it comes to trial, I have to concede that if we were to place western
trial systems along a spectrum ranging from those that were the most adversarial to
those that were the least adversarial, which is the way I prefer to view trial systems,
there are many features of our trial system that would place the United States at the
extreme end of the adversarial spectrum. American lawyers have the freedom to
mold evidence for adversary advantage in advance of trial that would be unethical
in other western trial systems, and advocacy in the United States knows few bounds.
At the same time, American trial judges are more passive than judges in other
systems, including even other common law countries, and prefer to see themselves
as detached and somewhat removed from the fray.
But despite this concession to our system's extreme adversarial tendencies,
I remain hesitant to describe our system as an adversary system. First because that
label implies that systems are defined as either adversary or non-adversary. As I
suggested, I do not think that is accurate. But perhaps more important is the fact
that as adversarial as our system can be, it often seems to me to be at different times
highly inquisitorial. I do not know what label to apply to a system that is at times
extremely adversarial and at other times extremely inquisitorial. A case that nicely
illustrates the dual personalities battling within our system is the Louise Woodward
case. As I am sure you recall, at the end of the trial, the defense asked that
manslaughter not be given to the jury so that the jury would be left with the choice
of either returning a verdict of second degree murder or an acquittal. In no other
trial system that I know of, either common law or continental, would this have been
considered a matter.to be controlled by the defense. But the judge gave the
instruction desired by the defense. If you want to understand how extremely
adversarial our trial system can be, there could hardly be a better example. The trial
judge did not see it as his responsibility to put to the jury the option that seemed
most likely to fit the facts.
Well, we all know the result. The gamble did not work for the defense: the
prosecutor gave a hell of a summation and the defendant "lost," receiving a life
sentence as she knew she would if she were to be convicted. When a system
emphasizes winning and losing so heavily and openly permits such an audacious
gamble, this sort of result is possible. But it is at this point that things start to get
very confusing for me. A few days later, the same judge but with very different
judicial responsibilities enters the courtroom and this judge is now concerned about
"justice" in this case. But where does this judge come from in an adversary system
and where was he at trial? Having permitted excellent defense attorneys to gamble
[Vol. 100:847
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at trial, having made sure that the defendant was fully informed of the consequences
of her gamble with the jury, where in an adversary system does this judge get the
authority to impose an involuntary manslaughter verdict out of the blue? I do not
dispute the justice of the verdict; I do dispute the way we got there in our
supposedly adversary system.
Later in the day, the inquisitorial judge had even more clearly emerged from
the ashes of the trial when it came time to sentence the defendant on the judge's
verdict of involuntary manslaughter. Like many American judges at sentencing, the
neutral and detached referee at trial turns out to have very broad discretion at
sentencing. In the Woodward case, the judge could have given the defendant a
sentence of two, ten, twelve, or even twenty years. And, very surprising
considering that we have an adversary system, this judge who had no responsibility
to put manslaughter to the jury, is going to make this very important decision all
alone: no tempering influence of citizens, not even the sort of collegial restraints
one would find in such a decision in systems that are supposedly highly
inquisitorial, such as The Netherlands. Nor will this decision be subject to broad
appellate review as you would find in any continental system given the importance
of this decision. Again, as we all know, this judge sentenced Ms. Woodward to
time served on the basis of his own personal conclusions as to Ms. Woodward's
criminal liability and the punishment she therefore deserved. Again, my concern
is not the outcome but rather the naked inquisitorial power exercised by a single
judge in our so-called adversary system.
I close with one more example of our so-called adversary system in which
the trial judge has the power to undo the jury's verdict. The case I have in mind is
United States v. Watts,3 a Supreme Court case from early last year.4 Watts was
convicted at trial of possessing 500 grams of crack found in his apartment, but was
acquitted by the same jury of using a firearm in the course of adrug crime. When
it came time for sentencing, the judge added four years to Watts' sentence because
he concluded - based on guns and ammunition found in a bedroom closet - that
Watts had used a firearm in connection with the drug possession crime. The United
States Supreme Court said that this was perfectly all right in aper curiam opinion
issued without having been preceded by oral argument. This is the same sort of
institutional inconsistency that is present in Woodward. On the one hand, the
Supreme Court has tied our trial system completely to juries in opinions full of
soaring rhetoric about the wisdom of juries and the importance of the jury as a
buffer between the power of the government and the liberty of individual citizens.
The Court has told us, for example, that when juries reach different conclusions
3 117 S. Ct. 633 (1997).
4 See William T. Pizzi, Watts: The Decline of the Jury, 9 FED. SENTENCE REP. 303 (1997).
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from those judges would have reached, it is usually because juries "are serving
some of the very purposes for which they were created and for which they are now
employed." Yet, a sentencing judge now has the last word and is free to reject the
jury's acquittal (indeed in the federal system the sentencing judge by statute must
reject the jury's acquittal in a situation like that presented in Watts) and add years
to the defendant's sentence if the judge decides that the defendant was responsible
for the crime despite the acquittal.
I think it is time to put aside the labels and the slogans that dominate our
descriptions of our system: that "we have an adversary system"; that "we don't trust
strong government officials"; that "judges must be detached and neutral referees";
that 'juries protect us from the power of the government"; and so on. Instead, we
need to look at what we actually have and what we actually do in our system.
Comparative study is a way of cutting through these labels and slogans to help us
see our system more clearly. What I see is a system that does not know what it
wants to happen at trial and does not know itself very well. It swings from
extremely adversarial to extremely inquisitorial, from vesting incredible power in
juries to permitting judges to undo some jury verdicts with which they disagree,
from incredibly weak judges at times to judges vested with tremendous power over
the liberty of citizens at sentencing. I don't think any of these extremes are healthy.
There is no disputing that European trial systems have been heavily
influenced by the American legal system, especially by the rights accorded suspects
in our system and by our tradition of an open examination of the evidence at trial.
But we are at a point in time when we could learn some things from their systems
as well.
5 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157 (1968).
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